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The Federal Judiciary-Inflation, Malfunction,
and a Proposed Course of Action
Daniel J. Meador*
Though not recognized annually, September 24, the birthday of the federal judiciary, is an important date in American
history. On that date in 1789, President Washington signed the
first Judiciary Act.' That Act created the system of federal
courts that, with a few significant changes, exists today. The Supreme Court and the district courts that the Act established still
remain.
Although Congress has made many statutory alterations
concerning the federal courts since that time, three changes
stand out as truly significant. The first was the 1875 statute giving the federal trial courts, for the first time, general jurisdiction
over cases arising under federal law and greatly enlarging the
jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases.' The second-and
the most significant structural change-was the introduction of
a tier of intermediate appellate courts through the Evarts Act of
l89LS Our present-day U.S. Courts of Appeals descend from
that Act. The third change was a jurisdictional rearrangement
flowing from the creation of those new appellate courts. The result was a shift, through the Judges' Bill of 1925: of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to a largely discretionary
basis. Broadly speaking, the federal judiciary in 1981 is the system established by the Act of 1789, modified by these later
changes.
As we move into the 1980's, the present judicial system, like
the national economy, is beset with near runaway inflation. The
inflation is of two sorts. One is inflation in the business of the
courts, an explosive increase in the quantity of cases being filed
* James Monroe Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This Article is adapted
from a paper presented at a conference on the federal courts sponsored by the American
Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., on October 1, 1980.
1. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
2. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137 18 Stat. 470.
3. Ch. 517,25 Stat. 826 (1891).
4. Pub. L. No. 68-415,43 Stat. 936 (1925).
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and litigated. The other is inflation in the number and variety of
personnel within the judicial branch. The inflation in personnel
has been caused by, and is in response to, the inflation in
caseloads. Dangerous consequences may follow, just as they may
in a period of unrestrained economic inflation, if the inflation in
caseloads and personnel remains unchecked or if measures are
not adopted to equip the judiciary to function soundly under
these altered circumstances.
The inflation in judicial business is well known and well
documented. It began in the early sixties and was rolling in high
gear by the advent of the seventies. It continues unabated. The
year 1960-roughly two decades ago-is a convenient point from
which to measure the magnitude of growth. Measured against
that base year, case filings, civil and criminal, in the federal district courts increased 110% by 1979.' Dispositions in those
courts increased 93%.6 Filings in the courts of appeals increased
a staggering 419%.' Dispositions in those courts increased
410%.8 In the Supreme Court in the 1978 Term there were 4,731
cases on the docket: an increase of more than 150% over the
1959 Term.lo Over this same period of time the number of cases
disposed of by full opinion rose from 9711 to 153.12
There is another aspect to the inflation of caseloads that is
difficult to quantify yet real in the view of participants and observers. This is the increase in the complexity of the courts' business. Today, as compared to 1960 and earlier, there are more
"large" cases in terms of numbers of parties, issues, and stakes.
5. [I9791 DIRECTOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICEU.S. COURTS
ANN.REP. 4-7 [hereinafter
cited as 1979 ANN.REP.]. In 1960, 59,284 civil cases and 29,828 criminal cases were commenced in federal district courts. In 1979, 154,666 civil cases and 32,688 criminal cases
were commenced in federal district courts.
6. Id. In 1960, 61,829 civil cases and 29,864 criminal cases were terminated in federal di'strict courts. In 1979, 143,323 civil cases and 33,411 criminal cases were terminated
in federal district courts.
7. Id. a t 3. In 1960, 3,899 appeals were commenced, while in 1979, 20,219 appeals
were commenced. In fiscal year 1980, filings in the courts of appeals climbed to 23,200,
Oct. 1980, at 8.
an increase of 14.7% over the previous year. THIRDBRANCH,
8. 1979 ANN.REP., supra note 5, at 3. In 1960, 3,713 cases were terminated; in 1979,
18,928 cases were terminated.
9. Id. at A-1.
ANN.REP. 66 [hereinafter
ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICEU.S. COURTS
10. [I9601 DIRECTOR
cited as 1960 ANN.REP.]. During the October Term, 1959, there were 1,862 cases docketed in the Court.
11. Id.
12. 1979 ANN.REP., supra note 5, at A-1. The number cited refers to those cases
disposed of by full opinion in the October 1978 Term.
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The issues are also more difficult and complex. At the same
time, there is also a greater volume of routine, even trivial business, unfamiliar to the federal judiciary in past decades.
Inflation in judicial personnel is readily documented, although perhaps not widely known. The inflation in judgeships,
though significant, is perhaps not radical considering the rise in
business and the growth in population of the country. In 1960
there were 226 federal district judgeships;13 in 1980 there were
516," a growth of 128%.In 1960 there were 68 courts of appeals
judgeships; in 1980 there were 132, a growth of 94%.lS
The most dramatic personnel inflation has been the rise in
number, variety, and status of officials within the judiciary who
are not Article I11 judges. There were 174 bankruptcy referees in
1960;" there are now 236 bankruptcy "judges."17 Prior to 1968
there were no federal magistrates. By 1979 there were 196 fulltime magistrates and 292 part-time magistrates serving in the
district courts.18 The number of law clerks serving the Article I11
judges rose from 264 in 19601@to 697 in 1979,"O an increase of
164%. In 1960 there were no staff attorneys in the appellate
courts; there are now 136." Today there are 10 circuit execut i v e ~Prior
. ~ ~ to 1971 this position did not exist. Overall, in 1960
there were 5,562 persons employed in the judicial branch of the
federal g ~ v e r n m e n tin
; ~ 1979
~
there were 12,563," an increase of
126% .2s
There are virtually no signs of a tapering off or decline in
the volume of judicial business. All indications point toward
continued increases. Since 1970, in every year except fiscal year
1978, filings in the courts of appeals have increased."' Filings in
13. 1960 ANN. REP., supra note 10, a t 85.
14. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 7.
15. Id. a t 3.
16. 1960 ANN. REP., supra note 10, a t 163.
17. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 23.
18. Id. at 128. The 292 figure represents 271 part-time and 21 "combination" positions. Magistrates replaced the part-time commissioners, who served prior to 1968.
1s. 1960 ANN. REP., supra note 10, a t 205.
20. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, at 22.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 1960 ANN. REP., supra note 10, at 205. Supreme Court personnel are exluded.
24. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, a t 22.
25. More detailed information on the growth of personnel in the federal judiciary
can be found in Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 VA.
L. REV.1031 (1979).
26. 1979 ANN. REP., supra note 5, a t 43.
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the district courts since 1970 have increased every year except
fiscal year 1973." Every year, Congress enacts statutes that give
rise to fresh litigation. It is difficult to find any statute enacted
by Congress in the last decade that reduces or eliminates any
significant category of litigation. Few, if any, would predict that
Congress will cease to legislate or will legislate to eliminate any
sizable clump of cases. Moreover, the Supreme Court continues
to hand down decisions opening up new avenues into the federal
courts, either by the recognition of new substantive rights of action or by holdings on such threshold access questions as standing, ripeness, and mootness. The American people are uncommonly litigious, and present conditions in our society are not
likely to diminish this trait. It seems highly probable that the
volume of business handled by the federal courts will continue
to increase year by year.
One possibility for a significant reduction in workload lies in
the curtailment of the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the
district courts. Bills to this effect have been under serious consideration in Congress since 1977." Since then the House of
Representatives has twice passed a bill to eliminate the general
diversity jurisdiction,'@but the Senate has not yet acted favorably on any such measures. Apart from this proposal, however,
there is not pending any serious measure that would reduce significantly the intake of business into the federal judiciary.
Throughout the history of the federal judiciary, the volume
of litigation has risen and fallen numerous times. A graph of the
growth of business from 1789 to the present would not be a
steady upward line; it would have peaks and valleys. But we
have now exceeded all previous peaks and are on a steady upward line, bound for even greater heights. No comprehensive
plan is before the country that would enable the judiciary to
meet the conditions that threaten stability and uniformity in
federal law.
27. Id. at 4-7.
28. See, e.g., S. 679, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); H.R. 1046, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 130,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S.
2389, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2094, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1613, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R.10050, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R.9622,95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9308,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9123, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977); H.R. 7243, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 761, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
29. H.R. 10050,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9622,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
On Oct. 4, 1978, the Senate incorporated the text of H.R. 9622 into its pending measure,
S. 1613. The House approved the bill, as amended by the Senate, the same day.
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The major response thus far has been the addition of personnel. Adding judges is an obvious and understandable response to sustained growth in caseloads. Congress has taken this
step many times throughout our history, most recently in 1978..O
A significant new twist is the addition of non-Article 111 personnel, as mentioned above. Providing more personnel for the
courts can of course equip them to deal with a greater quantity
of business and thereby overcome delay in adjudication, one of
the major evils of caseload inflation. However, adding judges a t
the appellate level creates in turn another serious problem: a
heightened difficulty in maintaining a nationally uniform body
of federal law. This threat to uniformity is one of the major
problems now afaicting the federal judiciary. Its solution lies in
restructuring or rearranging the judiciary at the appellate level.
In this respect, the present period resembles that quarter
century from the close of the Civil War to the passage of the
Evarts Act in 1891. Thus it may be useful, or at least interesting,
to look briefly at the conditions in the federal courts at that
time, the efforts to equip the courts to function under those conditions, and the step eventually taken by Congress.

The period beginning in the 1860's and culminating with
the creation of the courts of appeals a quarter century later in
1891 presents interesting parallels to the period commencing in
the 1960's. Then, as now, the federal judiciary was buffeted by
changes in the nation-economic, political, and social-and by
an enlarged jurisdiction. And then, as now, these altered circumstances posed great difficulties for the judiciary because it was
not structured to deal with the new conditions. Ultimately the
remedy lay in a new judicial structure-the insertion of the intermediate appellate courts-the very part of the system where
the greatest structural deficiencies are being experienced now.
With the close of the Civil War, large economic forces were
unleashed across the United States, leading to industrialization,
the development of the transcontinental rail system, and enormous growth in commercial activity over the remainder of the
30. Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (codified at 5
U.S.C. $ 5108; 28 U.S.C. 5s 41 note, 44, 44 note, 45 note, 46, 133, 133 note, 1337, 1445)
(1976 & Supp. 111 1979). This Act added 35 courts of appeals judgeships and 117 district
court judgeships, the largest single increase in the history of the judiciary.
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nineteenth century." This growth gave rise to substantial increases in litigation. Moreover, new federal legislation was enacted under which new kinds of legal controversies arose. New
litigation also stemmed from the aftermath of the War and from
Reconstruction measures.
The dockets of the federal trial courts and the Supreme
Court climbed rapidly in the postwar years. The rising tide of
federal litigation increased even more in 1875 with the enactment of the statute authorizing the federal trial courts, for the
first time, to entertain cases generally arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.s2 Liberalized removal provisions also contributed to the swelling of federal
dockets," as did an expansion of the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction to include any suit between citizens of different
states." The Supreme Court's docket doubled and then doubled
again in the two decades before 1880." The period, like the present, was one of an unprecedented increase in judicial business
at all levels.
It was obvious that a serious problem existed, but no solution could be agreed upon. Beginning in the mid-1860's the idea
of creating appellate courts, organized on the existing circuit basis, was persistently suggested and debated. With no consensus
forming over that idea, Congress, in 1869, created the new position of circuit judge and authorized the appointment of one such
judge for each of the nine circuits? Although the circuit judges
had some appellate functions as members of the circuit courts,
the main effect of this measure was to enhance judicial manpower at the trial level. The new judgeships did nothing to relieve the Supreme Court's business or to provide any significant
increase in terms of system-wide appellate capacity.
I t became increasingly evident that the most serious problem afaicting the system was insufficient appellate capacity. A
suggested solution during the 1870's and 1880's was to enlarge
the Supreme Court in various ways and to authorize it to sit in
sections or panels. This idea competed with the proposal to cre31. This recapitulation of the events leading to the Circuit Courts of Appeals Act is
drawn largely from F. FRANKFURTER
& J. LANDIS,
THEBUSINESS
OF THE SUPREME
COURT
56-102 (1927).
32. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
33. Id. 3 1.
34. Id. 33 2-4, 6, 7.
35. 13 CONG.REC.3464 (1882) (remarks of Sen. Davis).
36. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44.
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ate permanent intermediate appellate courts. In 1875 Congress
restricted Supreme Court review of admiralty cases and increased the monetary minimum of civil cases on appeal from the
circuit courts from $2,000 to $5,000.s7 This measure afforded
some relief, but it did not reach the fundamental problem,
namely, that a single appellate court sitting over the entire federal judicial system simply could not hear and decide a sutticient
volume of appeals.
The culminating efforts to solve the problem began in the
late 1880's. Attorney General Augustus H. Garland actively entered the fray, strongly recommending the creation of intermediate appellate courts.38 His successor as Attorney General, William H. Miller, continued to press this proposal.s9 The new
President of the United States, Benjamin Harrison, was suBciently persuaded of the seriousness of the problem to recommend, in his first message to Congress in 1889, the creation of
the intermediate appellate courts.'O Senator William J. Evarts of
New York, who had previously been attracted to the idea of enlarging the Supreme Court, became converted to the intermediate appellate court idea and assumed congressional leadership of
the movement. A committee of the American Bar Association
also supported the idea and worked with Senator Evarts in developing the specific bill?
As the bill worked its way through the two houses of Congress, there were the usual compromises and reshaping to meet
the various interests. The most significant and unfortunate compromise was the agreement in Congress, largely as the result of
pressures from the bar, to leave the old circuit courts intact.
Thus the system was left with the oddity of two separate kinds
of courts at the trial level. This was a price that had to be paid
in order to enlist adequate support for the new intermediate appellate courts. The bill passed and was signed into law by the
37. Act of Feb. 16, 1875, ch. 77, 18 Stat. 315.
38. [I8871 ATT'Y GEN.ANN.REP. XV;[I8881 ATT'YGEN.ANN.REP. xiv.
39. [I8891 ATT'YGEN.ANN.REP. xviii-xix; [I8901 ATT'YGEN.ANN.REP. xviii-xix.
40. Benjamin Harrison, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1889), reprinted
AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS
5467 (1897).
in MESSAGES
41. Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure, Report, 17
A.B.A. REP. 336,337 (1894). The ABA Committee on Relief of the Supreme Court, which
worked with Senator Evarts, consisted of David Dudley Field, Henry Hitchcock, Francis
Rawle, J. Randolph Tucker, George H. Bates, Edward Otis Hinkley, William Allen Butler, Thomas J. Semmes, J. Hubley Ashton, and Walter B. Hill. 13 A.B.A. REP. 95 (1890).
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President on March 3, 1891.42The bill created a court of appeals
in each of the existing nine circuits consisting of three judges,
two of whom were permanent circuit judges.
Another compromise was that these courts of appeals were
not given appellate jurisdiction over all lower court decisions; in
several categories of cases, appeals would still lie directly to the
United States Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the new courts of
appeals were given jurisdiction over a sizable proportion of all
federal appeals.4s
The new courts brought immediate and substantial relief to
the Supreme Court. Thus, this structural innovation in the federal judicial system proved to be the appropriate remedy for the
radical influx of litigation that had been going on for a quarter
century. Restructuring of the system was not complete, however,
until two later congressional enactments. One came in 1911
when the old circuit courts were finally abolished," despite continued opposition from leading lawyers.46 This step left the
United States District Courts as the sole trial forums in the federal judicial system. The next reform came in 1925 with the socalled Judges' Bill that gave the Supreme Court a large measure
of discretionary jurisdi~tion:~with almost all appeals from the
district courts routed initially to the courts of appeals. No significant structural or jurisdictional alterations have occurred since
1925.
The federal judiciary today is, of course, far larger than it
was a hundred years ago, or even fifty years ago, and its
problems are likewise larger. However, the major problem is similar in that it is structural and can thus be met, as it was ultimately met in 1891, only by some structural alterations. Likewise, as in the period of a hundred years ago, numerous
solutions for the current difficulties have been presented and debated. Are we now facing another ten years of debate, as our
predecessors faced in 1881, or can we galvanize ourselves into
action more quickly than that?
42. Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
43. Id. $$ 5-7.
44. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 8 289, 36 Stat. 1087.
REC.298-300 (1910). Opposition to the abolition of the circuit courts
45. 46 CONG.
was led by Hollis R. Bailey, Joseph H. Choate, James Buchanon, Charles D. Merrick,
Alex W. Smith, John D. Rouse, George D. Lancaster, James Quarles, Otto Raymond
Barnett, James H. Matheny, Ralph W. Breckenridge, and C.E.S. Wood, all members of
the ABA.
46. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936.
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During the quarter century before 1891, interest in restructuring the federal judiciary centered largely in Congress. At the
present time, however, concerns about judicial problems have
been much more widespread. Various nongovernmental groups
and individuals, as well as Congress, have worked to develop
new structural and jurisdictional arrangements that would enable the federal courts to function more effectively in contemporary circumstances. The major efforts since the late 1960's are
described below.
American Law Institute. The first effort launched since
1960 was the study by the American Law Institute on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It was initiated in response to a
suggestion by Chief Justice Earl Warren, made in an address to
the Institute in May 1959." The study was completed in 1968,
and the results were published in a book entitled Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts.48
The basic categories of jurisdiction-federal question and
diversity of citizenship-were preserved, but with certain adjustments. The aim was to realign state and federal jurisdiction in a
rational and contemporarily useful way. The entire set of proposals was introduced into Congress" and has been pending
there ever since. Hearings have been held at various times:O but
the proposals have not advanced beyond the committee level in
either house.
American Bar Foundation. The American Bar Foundation
initiated a study which represented the first effort to deal specifically with the worsening federal appellate court problem. The
results of the study were published in 1968 in a report entitled
Accommodating the Workload of the United States Courts of
Appeals." The report recommended several internal arrange47. Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren to the 36th Annual Meeting of the Ameri27-43 (1959).
can Law Institute (May 20, 1959), reprinted in 36 ALI PROCEEDINGS
48. AMERICAN
LAWINSTITUTE,
STUDYOF THE DIVISION
OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN
COURTS
(1968).
STATEAND FEDERAL
49. S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
50. Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1971: Continuation of Hearings on S. 1876
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1971: Hearings on
S. 1876 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
BAR FOUNDATION,
51. AMERICAN
ACCOMMODATING
THE WORKLOAD
OF THE UNITED
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ments and procedures that would enable the intermediate appellate courts to function more effectively. It recommended no basic restructuring or jurisdictional rearrangements. However, the
report posed several suggestions for further consideration, including the splitting of circuits and the creation of a "National
Circuit," using rotating circuit judges to resolve intercircuit
A significant by-product of this study was an article written
by the project director, Professor Paul Carringt~n.'~The most
important suggestion in the article was that the dockets of the
courts of appeals be divided along' subject matter lines and allocated among panels on that basis? The objective was to introduce greater stability into the law of the circuit.
The Freund Committee. The next effort was the Report of
the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court." The
study group was known informally as the Freund Committee after its Chairman, Professor Paul Freund of the Harvard Law
School. Appointed under the auspices of the Federal Judicial
Center, the committee was charged with the mission of studying
the Supreme Court's workload and recommending measures for
handling that workload more effectively. The Report made several recommendations, including the elimination of three-judge
district courts and the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction."
Its most controversial proposal was to create a new court known
as the "National Court of appeal^."'^
This proposed new court would have no permanent judges
of its own but would consist of seven U.S. Circuit Judges sitting
for staggered three-year terms. Its major function would be to
receive and screen all certiorari petitions and appeals. It would
funnel approximately 400 to 500 cases to the Supreme Court annually, from which that Court would select approximately 200
for hearing and decision on the merits. The National Court of
Appeals could retain cases of genuine circuit conflict for deciSTATESCOURTSOF APPEALS(1968).
52. Id. at 6-8.
53. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV.L. REV.542 (1969).
54. Id. at 587-96.
OF
55. FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
CENTER,REPORTOF THE STUDYGROUPON THE CASELOAD
THE SUPREME
COURT(1972).
56. Id. at 47.
57. Id. at 18-25.
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sions on the merits.s8
The Report had a peculiar fate in that the proposal for a
National Court of Appeals leaked to the press prior to publication. The proposal encountered vociferous opposition from influential judges and other parties." The new court was seen by
many as diluting the authority of the Supreme Court. Some also
objected to depriving litigants with important questions of direct
access to that Court. Unfortunately, the proposal was thought
by some critics to be a covert attack on the Supreme Court.
Whatever the reason, the proposal for this new appellate court
was stillborn. The Report was significant, however, in that it focused nationwide attention on federal appellate problems. It also
clarified some of the political limits on proposals for the restructuring of appellate courts.
The Hruska Commission. In 1972 Congress created the
Commission on the Federal Court Appellate System, chaired by
Senator Roman Hruska. The commission, the most important
governmental effort of the period concerning the courts, consisted of four members of the Senate, four members of the
House of Representatives, four persons appointed by the Chief
Justice, and four persons appointed by the President. It had a
full-time staff and held extensive hearings in various parts of the
country. Its first report in 1973 recommended a division of the
. ~ ~second report, submitted in 1975,
Fifth and Ninth C i r ~ u i t sIts
dealt with structure and internal operating procedures at the appellate l e v e P
The commission's most important and highly publicized
recommendation was the creation of a "National Court of Ap58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Black, The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise Proposal, 83 YALE
L.J. 883 (1974); Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U . CHI.
L. REV.473 (1973); Goldberg, One Supreme Court, NEWREPUBLIC,
Feb. 10, 1973, at 14;
Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent, 59 A.B.A.J. 253 (1973); Lay, Why
Rush to Judgment? Some Second Thoughts on the Proposed National Court of Ap173 (1975);Poe, Schmidt, & Whalen, A National Court of Appeals:
peals, 59 JUDICATURE
A Dissenting View, 67 Nw. U.L.REV. (1973); Address by Earl Warren to the Meeting of
the Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York (May 1, 1973), reprinted in part in 59
A.B.A.J. 721, 724 (1973).
ON REVISION
OF THE FEDERAL
COURTAPPELLATE
SYSTEM,THE GEO60. COMMISSION

BOUNDARIES
OF THE SEVERALJUDICIALCIRCUITS:RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
CHANGE(1973).
61. COMMISSION
ON REVISION
OF THE FEDERAL
COURTAPPELLATE
SYSTEM,STRUCTURE
AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES:
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR CHANGE
(1975).
GRAPHICAL
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peals"" by Congress. Though bearing the same name, this court
had little or no resemblance to the court proposed by the
Freund Committee. The proposed court would be inserted between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, with a casedeciding function and no certiorari-screening function. The
court would consist of seven permanent Article I11 judges and
would sit only en banc. Cases would be received in two ways-by
reference from the Supreme Court and by transfer from the existing U.S. Courts of Appeals, the Court of Claims, and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Any case decided by the
new court would be reviewable by the Supreme Court on
certiorari.
The Hruska Commission proposals were introduced
promptly into Congress," where they remain pending. The proposal to divide the Fifth Circuit has been adoptedr but there is
no prospect of early action concerning the Ninth Circuit. The
proposal to create a National Court of Appeals has received little congressional attention thus far, although it has been the
subject of discussion in legal literature?
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice. This nongovernmental body was created in 1971 to act as an advisor on appellate matters to the Federal Judicial Center and to the National
Center for State Courts. Chaired by Professor Maurice Rosenberg, it consisted of thirty members, including judges, lawyers,
and law professors. Over a four-year period it considered a variety of problems concerning both state and federal appellate
courts. The council developed a set of considerations that should
govern the creation of any new federal appellate court or any
restructuring at the federal appellate level? These and other
62. Id. at 8.
63. 's. 2763, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2762, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R.
11,219, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 11,218, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
64. The bill passed the Senate in June 1980. S. 2830, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
H.R. 7645,96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). After this paper was presented, Congress enacted
the bill dividing the Fifth Circuit, creating a new Eleventh Circuit. Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452,94 Stat. 1994 (to be codified at
28 U.S.C. 55 1, 41).
65. See, e.g., Hruska, The National Court of Appeals: An Analysis of Viewpoints, 9
CREIGHTON
L. REV.286 (1975); Swygert, The Proposed National Court of Appeals: A
Threat to Judicial Symmetry, 51 IND.L.J. 327 (1976); Comment, An Intermediate National Appellate Court: Solution or Diversion?, 22 VILL. L. REV.1022 (1977). In July
1981, Sen. Howard T. Heflin introduced S. 1529, a bill to create a National Court of
Appeals similar to that proposed by the Hruska Commission.
66. ADVISORY
COUNCIL
ON APPELLATEJUSTICE,
Recommendation for Improving the
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recommendations were made available to the Hruska Commission. They were then discussed at the National Conference on
Appellate Justice in 1975, sponsored by the Advisory C o u n ~ i l . ~ ~
In part, the principles devised by the council would support the
creation of a new court along the lines of the Hruska Commission proposal.
American Bar Association. Through its Special Committee
on Coordination of Judicial Improvements and ultimately
through House of Delegates action, the American Bar Association developed a position generally supporting the proposal of
the Hruska Commission to create a National Court of Appeals,
but with jurisdiction limited to cases referred to it by the Supreme
Individual Judges and Lawyers. The above efforts in the
early 1970's focused attention on appellate problems, particularly in the federal appellate system, to a greater extent than at
any time since the years preceding the Act of 1891, and perhaps
as never before in the history of the American judiciary. As a
result, appellate problems were the focus of discussion within
various bar groups, a t conferences, and in legal literature. Members of the judiciary who contributed to the debate included
Federal Circuit Judges Friendly:.
Haynsworth,lo H u f ~ t e d l e r , ~ ~
McGowan,12 Leventhal,ls Aldisert,14 Bell," Rosenn,16 Rubin,l7
Federal Intermediate Appellate System, in 4 MATERIALS
FOR

A NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
APPELLATE
JUSTICE
163 (1975).
COUNCIL
ON APPELLATE
JUSTICE,
Expediting Review of Felony
67. Id.; ADVISORY
FOR A NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
ON APPELLATE
JUSConvictions After Trial, in 3 MATERIALS
TICE 34 (1975); ADVISORY
COUNCIL
ON APPELLATE
JUSTICE,
National Court Development,
in 4 MATERIALS
FOR A NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
ON APPELLATE
JUSTICE
202 (1975); ADVISORY
COUNCIL
ON APPELLATE
JUSTICE,
Reports and Recommendations on Improvements of
FOR A NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
ON APPELLATE
JUSTICE
Appellate Practices, in 5 MATERIALS
127 (1975).
OF ACTION
TAKEN
BY THEHOUSEOF DELEGATES
OF THE AMERICAN
BAR
68. SUMMARY
ASSOCIATION
4 (Feb. 1976).
FEDERAL
JURISDICTION
(1973); Friendly, Averting the Flood by
69. See H. FRIENDLY,
L. REV.634 (1974).
Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL
70. See Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal ApL. REV.597 (1974); Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve
pellate System, 59 CORNELL
the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973).
71. See Hufstedler, Courtship and Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545 (1974).
72. See Remarks by Carl McGowan to the National Conference on Appellate Justice
(Jan. 23-26, 1975), reprinted in WTERIAL
FOR A NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
ON APPELLATE
JUSTICE
(1975).
73. See Leventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.432 (1976); Leventhal, A Modest Proposal for a Multi-Circuit
Court of Appeals, 24 AM.U . L. REV.881 (1975).
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and Lay,18 as well as state appellate judges." Numerous law
professors and others also contributed to the interchange?O
From a restructuring standpoint, one of the most significant
suggestions to appear in the literature was the proposal for a
National Court of Criminal appeal^.^' That court would hear
and decide all criminal appeals from the United States District
Courts and would entertain state criminal cases involving federal questions. The Supreme Court would exercise certiorari jurisdiction over the decisions of this new court.
The Department of Justice Committee. At the Sixth Circuit Judicial Conference in 1975, President Gerald Ford spoke
on the problems and needs of the federal courts.82 Pursuant to
that Presidential interest, Attorney General Edward Levi appointed a committee within the Department of Justice, chaired
by then Solicitor General Robert Bork, to survey the problems
74. See Aldisert, Appellate Justice, 11 U. MICH.J.L. REF.317 (1978).
75. See Bell, Toward a More Efficient Federal Appeals System, 54 JUDICATURE
237
(1971).
76. See Rosenn, Trends in Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 39
OHIOST. L.J. 791 (1978).
77. See Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.448 (1976).
78. See Lay, Reconciling Tradition with Reality: The Expedited Appeal, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 419 (1976).
79. E-g., Cameron, The Central Staff: A New Resolution to an Old Problem, 23
U.C.L.A. L. REV.465 (1976); Cameron, National Court of State Appeals: A View from
the States, 65 A.B.A.J. 709 (1979); Hopkins, Reviewing Sentencing Discretion: A
Method of Swift Appellate Action, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.491 (1976); Hopkins, Small
Sparks from a Low Fire: Some Reflections on the Appellate Process, 38 BROOKLYN
L.
REV.551 (1972).
80. See, e.g., P. CARRINGTON,
D. -OR
& M. ROSENBERG,
JUSTICE
ON APPEAL
(1976); Betten, Institutional Reform in the Federal Courts, 52 IND. L.J. 63 (1976);
Bright, The Changing Nature of the Federal Appeals Process in the 1970Ds,65 F.R.D.
L. REV.571 (1974);
496 (1975); Cramton, Federal Appellate Justice i n 1973, 59 CORNELL
Finley, The Appellate System: On a Vulnerable Plateau, TRIAL,Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 19;
Hazard, Standards of Judicial Administration: Appellate Courts, 62 A.B.A.J. 1015
(1976); Leflar, Appellate Judicial Innovation, 27 OKLA.L. REV.321 (1974); Meador, Appellate Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 VA. L. REV.255 (1975); Robinson, Proposal and Analysis of a Unitary System for Review of Criminal Judgments, 54
B.U. L. REV.485 (1974); Rosenberg, Enlarging the Federal Courts' Capacity to Settle
the National Law, 10 GONZ.L. REV.709 (1975).
81. See Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal ApL. REV.597 (1974); Haynsworth, A New Court to Improve
pellate System, 59 CORNELL
the Administration of Justice, 59 A.B.A.J. 841 (1973). A broader proposal for a court
that would review both criminal and civil appeals was suggested by Chief Justice Cameron. Cameron, National Court of State Appeals: A View from the States, 65 A.B.A.J.
709 (1979).
82. The President's Remarks at a Breakfast for Participants Attending the ConferCOMP.OF PRES.DOC.745-47 (July 13, 1975).
ence on Mackinac Island, Mich., 11 WEEKLY
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and develop recommended solutions. The committee completed
its work in 1976.83
The committee recommendations included proposals to create a set of administrative law tribunals, possibly with trial and
appellate divisions, manned by Article I judges? These courts
would provide judicial review for a multitude of administrative
actions under federal regulatory laws in fields such as health, occupational safety, social security, labor, and environmental prote~tion.~'
If implemented, this proposal would divert from the
existing federal courts some 20,000 or more cases annually.
The committee reasserted the Freund Committee's recommendation that the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction be
eliminated:' and it recommended abolishing diversity of citizenship jurisdiction." The committee recommended the creation of
a permanent interbranch Council on Federal Courts to work on
continuous planning and coordinating improvements in the judi~ i a r yHowever,
.~~
the committee did not favor the creation of a
National Court of appeal^.^^
Given the original Presidential impetus, the committee's report presumably would have served as the basis for an administration program to be urged upon Congress if President Ford
had been elected in 1976. However, it was not until January
1977, a few days before the inauguration of President Carter,
that the report appeared in print and became public. Because of
this timing, the report unfortunately received little public attention, although several of the recommendations were pursued vigorously by the Carter administration.
Ofice for Improvements in the Administration of Justice.
The last effort of the decade, outside of Congress and the courts,
was initiated by Attorney General Griffin Bell. Shortly after he
took office in late January 1977, he established, as a new unit
within the Department of Justice, the Office for Improvements
in the Administration of Justice (OIAJ).OOThis Office embodied
the idea that the Department of Justice be committed perma83. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE
COMMITTEE
ON REVISION
OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
SYSFEDERAL
COURTS(1977).
84. Id. at 9..
85. Id.
86. Id. at 12.
87. Id. at 15.
88. Id. at 16.
89. Id. at 18.
90. 42 Fed. Reg. 8140 (1977).
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nently, through a continuously functioning office, to justice system studies and improvements. Attorneys General from the beginning of the government have made proposals from time to
time for improving the federal judiciary. As mentioned earlier,
Attorneys General Garland and Miller were active in the late
1880's in the effort to bring about the establishment of the intermediate appellate courts. But until 1977 there was never an office with a mandate to work continuously on the entire range of
the justice system, to identify its problems, and to recommend
solutions. The former Office of Policy and Planning had dealt
primarily with problems within the criminal justice field.
During the two years following its creation, OIAJ developed
and attempted to promote in Congress, on behalf of the Department of Justice and the administration, several proposals to improve the federal judiciary. The earliest of the OIAJ proposals
was a bill to enlarge the civil and criminal jurisdiction of federal
magistrates. That proposal was designed to augment judicial
manpower a t the trial level. The bill was enacted in late 1979.@l
OIAJ also developed a bill carrying forward the recommendations of the Freund Committee and the Levi-appointed Justice Department committee to eliminate the Supreme Court's
obligatory j~risdiction.~~
The latter committee's recommendation to abolish the general diversity jurisdiction was also endorsed in the C o n g r e s ~ .The
~ ~ Office also developed proposals
aimed at improving the administration of the federal judiciary
by reducing the size and altering the composition of the Judicial
Councils of the circuits and requiring the courts of appeals to
appoint advisory committees to assist them in formulating rules
of practice and internal operating p r o ~ e d u r e s . ~
91. The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (amending
28 U.S.C. 55 631-636, 604(d)(3), 1915 (1976); 18 U.S.C. 5 3401 (1976)).
92. Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 3100 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (statements and discussions of Wade H. McCree, Jr., and Daniel
J. Meador). The measure passed the Senate in 1979. S. 450,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
93. Diversity of Citizenship JurisdictionlMagistrates Reform-1979: Hearings on
H.R. 1046 and H.R. 2202 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 133
(1979) (statement of Daniel J. Meador); Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction:
Hearings on S. 2094, S. 2389 and H.R. 9622 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 64
(1978) (statement of Daniel J. Meador).
94. S. 677, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
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The most significant idea developed in OIAJ concerning the
appellate courts was the proposal to create a new intermediate
appellate court. The court would be known as the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This new court would
be brought about by a fusion of the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The new court would
have jurisdiction over all of the appellate business now handled
by those two courts and, in addition, would have nationwide jurisdiction over all appeals from the district courts in patent
cases as well as a few other kinds of cases. The proposal also
included the creation of a new Article I forum known as the
United States Claims Court. This court would handle the trial
business of the present Court of Claims." That proposal passed
the Senate in 19799'jand passed the House in 1980.97The bills
contained minor differences, however, and the proposal died in
conference in late 1980. It was reintroduced in 1981.
All of these proposals, formulated by OIAJ and endorsed by
the Attorney General, were incorporated into a Presidential
message to Congress on February 27, 1979.98The legislative proposals accompanying that message had been worked out collaboratively by OIAJ with key staff personnel of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the House Judiciary Subcommittee. The
proposals were announced by President Carter at a White House
press briefing attended by the Attorney General and members of
the Senate and House Judiciary committee^.^^
Thus, by the close of the decade, significant proposals
designed to place the federal judiciary in a more effective position had received Presidential backing and were part of an administration program for congressional action. A similar development likely would have occurred had the Ford administration
remained in office, in view of the interest voiced by President
Ford and carried forward by the committee appointed by AttorMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 35, 71 (1979)
(statement of Daniel J. Meador).
95. The proposal is discussed in the Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (May 9, 1979), reprinted in 84 F.R.D. 429,465-89; Haworth & Meador, A Proposed New Federal Intermediate Appellate Court, 12 U. MICH.J.L. REF.201 (1978).
96. S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
97. H.R. 3806, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
98. 15 WEEKLY
COMP.OF PRES.DOC.342-46 (Feb. 27, 1979).
99. 15 WEEKLY
COMP.OF PRES.DOC.340 (Feb. 27, 1979).
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ney General Levi.loo
That committee's recommendation that a Council on Federal Courts be created was sought to be implemented by OIAJ.
However, after discussions among representatives of OIAJ, the
Senate Judiciary Committee, the House Judiciary Committee,
Vice President Mondale's Office, and the judiciary, the conclusion was reached that the formal creation of such a body was
probably not feasible any time soon. As a result of those discussions, however, representatives from the three governmental
branches met in Williamsburg, Virginia in early 1978.They have
met there every year since that time in a seminar-style gathering
under the aegis of the Brookings Institution. Representatives at
these sessions discuss currently pending legislation concerning
the courts, as well as problems of the judiciary that may be the
subject of future legislation. Although informal and unofficial,
these annual sessions provide a means of communication among
the three governmental branches concerning the judiciary.
Congressional Activity. Although congressional action may
seem small in relation to the magnitude of the judiciary's
problems and the efforts of the last dozen years, it has not been
insignificant. Congress created the Federal Judicial Center in
1968 to provide a research and educational arm for the federal
courts.lol The Center's budget has been regularly increased over
the years since then. Currently the budget is in excess of eight
million dollars.lo2The Act initiating the federal magistrate system was also passed in 1968.loSCongressional activity over the
next several years was devoted to hearings on the ALI proposals,lMthe creation of the Hruska Commission,10sand to hearings
on circuit splitting.lo6
Congressional concern with federal judicial problems entered a new phase in 1977.Beginning early that year, in the first
session of the 95th Congress, the two subcommittees of the Sen100. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
101. Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, 81 Stat. 664 (codified at 28 U.S.C. $5
611, 620-29 (1976)).
102. 1979 ANN.REP.,supra note 5, at 35.
103. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified at 28
U.S.C. $5 631-639 (1976)).
104. See hearings cited at note 50 supra.
105. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 806.
106. Circuit Realignment: Hearings on S. 2988, S. 2989, and S. 2990 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1974).
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ate and House Judiciary Committees charged with jurisdiction
over courts stepped up congressional attention on these matters.
In the Senate, the Judiciary Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery acquired a new chairman, Senator
Dennis DeConcini of Arizona. During the next two years, that
subcommittee was the center of Senate interest regarding court
problems. Much of the subcommittee's agenda was worked out
in collaboration with the Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice. In addition, other measures were developed
within its own staff and with the staff of the Judiciary Committee. The subcommittee held hearings on the bills to expand magistrate jurisdiction,lo7to limit or abolish diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction,108to eliminate the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction,lO@
to authorize court-annexed arbitration in the district
courts,l1° to create the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit,ll1 the U.S.Claims Court, and the U.S. Court of Tax Appeals, and numerous other measures aimed at improving the
federal judiciary.
In the House, the Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Constitution, chaired by Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, approached these problems by
first holding exploratory hearings on the justice system in the
spring of 1977. Numerous individuals testified about the needs
and problems of the federal courts and the administration of
justice generally.l12 Then, during the next two years the subcommittee held hearings on the magistrate bill,lla the diversity of
107. Magistrate Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1612 and S. 1613 Before the Subcomrn.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977).
108. Federal Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: Hearings on S. 2094, S. 2389,
and H.R. 9622 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
109. See hearings cited at note 92 supra.
110. The Court-Annexed Arbitration Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2253 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
111. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979:
Addendum to Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the Subcomrn. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
112. Hearings on the State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
113. See hearings cited at note 93 supra.
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citizenship bills,l14 and the bill to create the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Claims Court.l15
In addition to the activities in these House and Senate subcommittees, the Senate Judiciary committee, in early 1979,
launched consideration of a package of proposals, consisting of
already pending measures plus an array of new ideas to improve
the federal courts.116 The carryover measures included the bills
on diversity jurisdiction117 and magistrates.ll8 New proposals
concerned the organization of the circuit Judicial Councils11@
and the creation of a U.S. Court of Tax Appeals,120 U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,lm and U.S.Claims Court."' All
of these measures, except the proposal for a Tax Court of Appeals, had just been endorsed by the President in his message of
February 27, 1979.1aS
Despite the many hearings and the considerable efforts of
governmental and nongovernmental groups throughout the
19707s,Congress passed only three significant bills to equip the
federal judiciary to deal with contemporary conditions: the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,124the Omnibus Judgeship Act
of 1978,12' and the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979.1U These all
came near the end of the decade. Collectively, these measures
enable the federal judiciary to adjudicate a larger number of
cases within more reasonable periods of time. As suggested earlier, however, the substantial addition to judicial manpower and
the change in judicial business have resulted in a different judicial system than existed just a few years ago.
114. Id.
115. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Act of 1980: Hearings on H.R.
3806 Before the Subcornm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice
of the House Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). H.R. 3806 passed the House
on Sept. 15, 1980 and the bill was sent to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Sept.
17. The Senate committee discharged the bill and placed it on the Senate Calendar on
Sept. 30, 1980.
116. See hearings cited at note 111 supra.
117. S. 2389, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
118. S. 237, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
119. S. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sew. 3 121 (1979).
120. Id. $ 401.
121. Id. $ 301.
122. Id. $ 311.
COMP.OF PRES.DOC.342 (Feb. 27, 1979).
123. 15 WEEKLY
124. Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2549 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11, 28
U.S.C. (Supp. I1 1978)).
125. See note 30 supra.
126. See note 91 supra.
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Judicial Actions. In addition to the changes wrought by the
recent legislation, significant changes have been brought about
within the courts during the past decade by the judges themselves. These have altered radically the way in which the business of the federal courts is conducted. The judges have introduced new management techniques at both trial and appellate
levels. Computerization has made much headway. Some of the
most striking changes have come within the courts of appeals
through new internal operating procedures, the use of central
st& attorneys, and the screening and tracking of appeals. These
and other steps, which allow a substantial percentage of cases to
be decided through expedited processes, have changed the face
of the judiciary as compared to that in the mid-1960's and have
enabled the courts to avoid disastrous breakdowns threatened
by ever-rising case filings.
Although the legislation recently enacted by Congress is
helpful in adding to the resources of the judiciary and in working a modest restructuring at the trial level, these enactments,
combined with the actions taken by the judges, fall short of
placing the judiciary in a position to deal effectively with its
contemporary business. In particular, the problems of lack of
uniformity in federal law are not ameliorated by these measures.
Since congressional action is necessary to overcome the most s i e
nificant deficiencies in the court system, we must understand
the impediments to such action if meaningful results are to be
achieved.

The impediments to congressional action stem from a variety of circumstances briefly described below. Any one of these
poses difficulties for the proponents of court improvement legislation; in combination they are formidable.
Congressional Priorities, Attention, and Time. The American Congress is beset in the late twentieth century with an almost endless list of problems, demands, and challenges. These
range from trivial matters to questions of national and global
significance. They concern energy, national defense, disarmament, tax reform, medical care, education, immigration, and so
on. Courts, the justice system, and related problems are also on
the agenda. But the congressional agenda is filled with so many
issues perceived to be of greater and more urgent importance
that most members of Congress-indeed, all but a tiny hand-
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ful-find courts far down on their list of priorities. They simply
do not have the time or the inclination to focus on long-range
problems concerning the judiciary. Their attention is dispersed
over so many matters and is claimed by so many other demands
that Congress as a whole finds it difficult to give the judiciary
the kind of attention necessary to bring about significant
reforms.
Lack of Influential Political Constituencies. An effectively
functioning court system is everybody's business. There are few
matters of greater general public importance. However, the subject is not one around which there has coalesced any influential
political constituency that prompts Congress to act, as in other
areas such as labor, welfare, taxation, medical care, education,
agriculture, and so on. There are, of course, groups interested in
judicial improvements, but they are relatively small and lack political clout. Thus judicial problems are not brought to the attention of Congress by the extensive lobbying efforts employed
by other important interest groups.lm This circumstance, in
part, contributes to the priority problems already discussed.
The relative weakness of court reform interests in the political arena also makes it difficult to activate the President on this
subject. Thus, court improvement bills pending in Congress seldom attract strong support from the administration.
Special Interest Opposition. Although there are no special
interest groups of political magnitude affirmatively supporting
court reform efforts, there are numerous special interest groups
that will promptly rise in opposition to such efforts. Many of the
influential political constituencies have watchdog services that
pick up the slightest proposal to alter structure, jurisdiction, or
procedure of the courts in any way that might arguably have
some adverse impact upon their special interests. When that circumstance is coupled with the lack of an effective constituency
affirmatively pressing for court reform, the result is predictable:
no action by Congress. The totality of the circumstances-more
urgent and pressing national priorities, lack of affirmative constituencies pushing reform, and special interests ready to rise in
127. To provide a formal means of communicating the judiciary's concerns to the
Congress, a proposal has been made for several years to invite the Chief Justice to address periodically a joint session. A bill embodying this idea passed the Senate in 1980.
S. 2483, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Hearings were held in the House on Sept. 19, 1980.
Hearings on H.R. 6597 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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opposition-makes it difficult for any significant court reform
measure to attract the serious attention of Congress and to progress through the legislative labyrinth.
Lawyer and Bar Negativism.Although a few individual lawyers have, at various times in American history, including the
present, exercised significant leadership roles in bringing about
court improvements, such individuals are an infrequent minority. Likewise, although bar organizations occasionally support
court reform efforts,128such support is unusual. The dominant
attitude among individual lawyers and among the organized bar
is either indifference or negativism regarding proposals to alter
existing structure, jurisdiction, or procedure.12@
There appear to be several reasons for this indifference or
negativism. One is simple inertia-the understandable human
disinclination to alter a known and comfortable existing arrangement. Although this tendency is natural, it seems more prevalent among lawyers than among other breeds of mankind. Another reason for the negativism relates to the specialization of
the bar. Today, to a far greater degree than in past decades, lawyers tend to concentrate in areas of the law where they represent
distinct groups of clients. Consequently, lawyers tend to react to
matters in terms of their clients' interests, rather than as independent, detached, and professional observers. A lawyer with a
128. E.g., Hufstedler & Nejelski, A.B.A. Action Commission Challenges Litigation
Cost and Delay, 66 A.B.A.J. 965 (1980) (The ABA Action Commission to Reduce Court
Costs and Delay was established to promote experimental procedures to expedite litigation and to make it less expensive.); Report of the Special Comm. on Coordination of
Judicial Improvements, 101 A.B.A. Rw. 350 (1976) (The ABA supported the adoption
by Congress of S. 2762, a bill for the establishment of a National Court of Appeals,
except as it related to transfer jurisdiction; in February 1974 the House of Delegates had
adopted a resolution supporting in principle the creation of a new appellate court.).
129. This atmosphere is not easy to document because it is not always reflected in
published material. A recent example that can be documented is the opposition of certain groups of trial lawyers to measures aimed at limiting or abolishing the diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/
Magistrate Reform 1979 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 54
(1979) (statement of John C. Shepherd); Hearings on Federal Diversity of Citizenship
Jurisdiction Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1978) (statement of John P.
Frank); Hearings on Diversity of Citizenship JurisdictionlMagistrate Reform Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1977) (statement of Robert G.
Begam). Leading members of the American bar opposed abolition of the US. Circuit
Courts in the early 20th century long after they had ceased to serve any useful purpose.
See note 45 supra.
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truly general practice does not have this problem to the same
degree. Because by definition he represents all types of clients
from all walks of life, no particular client or class of clients
claims any special lock on his thoughts, time, or income. Consequently, general practitioners may think more objectively about
what may be good for the system, but such lawyers are now few.
A final possible explanation for lawyer indifference or negativism has to do with the lawyers' own economic interests.
Sometimes proposals for court improvement are seen as threatening those interests. They may either diminish the lawyers'
practice in some way or make their practice economically less
rewarding. Whatever the reasons, when almost any proposal for
a significant change in the courts is advanced, numerous lawyers
and bar associations can be expected to come forward in
opposition.
Lack of Continuity of Program and Effort.Another impediment to congressional action is the lack of continuity in the programs and efforts to reform the judicial system. This, in large
part, is a result of all of the foregoing circumstances. Two factors
make it unlikely that any well-developed program of reform will
be pressed with continuity of effort over a sufficient period of
time to bring it to fruition: the lack of congressional time and
attention, because of other more urgent priorities, and the lack
of an affirmative political constituency pushing for court reform.
Such efforts as there are tend to be sporadic and aimed a t relatively narrow, specific aspects of the court system, rather than at
broad, system-wide problems. Even when an extensive, wellthought-out proposal is presented to Congress, continuity af effort seems to be lacking. Interest, organization, and resources are
insufficient to maintain an impetus behind the proposal long
enough for it to pass both Houses of Congress.
An additional reason why few of the significant judicial proposals of the last decade have been enacted may be the lack of
consensus in American society about important public questions.
The rise of single interest groups and the political fragmentation
evident during the past decade probably interfere with the development of a coherent body of opinion concerning solutions to
the courts' problems.
Despite these circumstances militating against significant
court reform enactments in Congress, we cannot simply abandon
efforts to equip the judiciary to cope with inflation and malfunction. We must devise a course of action that takes the impedi-
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ments into account and is designed to achieve results despite
them. Before thinking about courses of action to be pursued,
however, we need to identify more precisely the problems of the
federal judiciary on which attention should primarily be focused.

IV. PRIORITIES
At any given time, a host of matters concerning jurisdiction,
procedure, and management of the courts could profit from
study and change. Continuous efforts to improve the judiciary in
all respects should of course be maintained. However, given the
limitations on congressional time and on available resources
within the bench and the bar, we must avoid dispersing effort
over too large an array of matters. Instead, we should give priority to the most pressing system-wide problems, the resolution of
which would most significantly aid the judiciary in administering
justice under law. The chief objective should be to provide
sound, expeditious adjudication and to maintain a high degree of
nationwide uniformity in federal law.
The federal judicial system is malfunctioning primarily because the existing structure is not designed to handle contemporary business effectively. The problem is one of judicial architecture. A court system is like a building. As years pass, as the
nature of the building's business changes, and as the t r a f h patterns are altered, the structure needs to be remodeled, renovated, or perhaps even rebuilt. The courts are no different.
Structures are not created for all time. We create what seems to
be best in light of the circumstances of the day, but we do so
with the realization that conditions change.lS0 Lord Macauley
wisely observed that it is necessary to reform in order to preserve. One can change consistently with enduring principles. Indeed, the principles are unlikely to be kept alive and vigorous
unless reforms are instituted from time to time. Today, as in the
1880's, we have come to a point where architectural modification
of the system is needed at the appellate level. That should be
assigned first priority.
Intermediate Appellate Court Restructuring. A natural response to the sowing quantity of judicial business is to add
judges to the courts. That response is based on analogies to
other situations in which an increase in business tends to over130. "[Glreat judiciary acts, unlike great poems, are not written for all time." F.

FRANKFURTER
& J. LANDIS,
THEBUSINESS
OF THE SUPREME
COURT107 (1927).
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load existing personnel. For example, as the number of customers attracted to a bank grows, the existing tellers' windows become insufficient to receive the increased volume of deposits and
checks. A reasonable response is to increase the number of windows. To a considerable extent, this analogy holds true for trial
courts. Adding trial judges will equip a trial court to handle a
greater volume of cases. Apart from providing a sufficient number of courtrooms and clerical personnel, there is no serious institutional difficulty with that approach. Each trial judge is an
autonomous decisionmaking entity. He sits alone, hears matters
by himself, and renders independent decisions. The trial judge
conducts adjudicative business essentially the same, whether the
particular court has three judges or a hundred judges.
In an appellate court, the situation is significantly different.
Appellate judges rarely, if ever, sit alone. Appellate decisions are
rendered collegially. Thus, the addition of judges to an appellate
court does not necessarily increase the court's capacity or efficiency, unless the court is divided so that it does not sit as a
single decisional unit. This is what has been done in the US.
Courts of Appeals and in other large appellate courts. Each U.S.
Court of Appeals now sits in multiple panels of three. The only
potential gain in adding appellate judges is to increase the number of three-judge decisional units within each circuit. This step
increases the capability of the court to decide more appeals and
thereby to cope with the problem of quantity.
But here we see an illustration of a phenomenon often encountered in judicial reform: a step taken to alleviate one problem sometimes creates other, equally troubling problems. Increasing the number of decisional units to meet the growth in
quantity threatens uniformity, evenhandedness, and stability in
the application of law. The most stable, certain, and predictable
appellate arrangement would be a court composed of permanently assigned judges, all of whom sit on each appeal. The farther we move away from that model, the greater the risk of eroding those qualities. Multiple decisional units within a single
appellate jurisdiction risk the creation of a judicial Tower of
Babel.
For years following the creation of the U.S. Courts of Appeals in 1891, there were only two circuit judges in each of the
federal judicial circuits. Both sat on virtually all appeals in the
circuit, with either a Supreme Court justice or a district judge
sitting as the third member of the panel. As judicial business has
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grown in the twentieth century, the number of judges provided
for each circuit has increased. However, the system of sitting in
three-judge panels has continued. As the number of circuit
judges grew, each court of appeals began to hear appeals in varying and shifting panels of three?' Although this practice introduced elements of uncertainty, as long as the court did not consist of more than six or seven judges, the level of uncertainty
was not intolerable. Moreover, if there were no more than nine
judges, a court of appeals could occasionally hold an en banc
hearing to iron out any uncertainties or unevenness resulting
from the use of multiple three-judge panels.
The federal judicial system has now reached the stage where
the number of appellate decisional units risks serious unevenness and uncertainty within each circuit and between the circuits. Since passage of the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, the
Ninth Circuit has consisted of twenty-three judges. The Fifth
Circuit consisted of twenty-six judges prior to its division on October 1, 1981.182Eight circuits now exceed nine judges in size.lS8
As the likelihood of differing interpretations and applications of federal law has increased, the efficacy of an en banc procedure to iron out intern4 circuit variations has greatly diminished. When an appellate court exceeds nine judges, it is widely
believed that the en banc procedure is more cumbersome, less
likely to be employed, and less productive of a coherent, collegial decision. Whatever might be the optimum number for an en
banc body, it is clear that a single court of twenty-three or
twenty-six judges makes a mockery of a judicial proceeding. The
Fifth Circuit sat en banc several times after it was authorized
twenty-six judgeships. An examination of some of the en banc
opinions produced by that body suggests that it ceased to be the
kind of appellate tribunal to which the Anglo-American legal
system has been accustomed. Opinions were issued by clumps of
judges, as though they were members of a convention or a legis131. 28 U.S.C. 5 46(c) (1976 & Supp. I11 1979).
132. The Circuit was divided, effective October 1, 1981, into the Eleventh Circuit,
consisting of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, and the Fifth Circuit, consisting of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. 85 1, 41).
133. District of Columbia Circuit, 11 judges; First Circuit, 4 judges; Second Circuit,
11 judges; Third Circuit, 10 judges; Fourth Circuit, 10 judges; Fifth Circuit, 14 judges;
Sixth Circuit, 11 judges; Seventh Circuit, 9 judges; Eighth Circuit, 9 judges; Ninth Circuit, 23 judges; Tenth Circuit, 8 judges; Eleventh Circuit, 12 judges.
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lative body instead of an appellate ~ 0 u r t . l ~ ~
In a court of nine judges there are 84 possible combinations
of three; in a court of fifteen judges there are 455 such combinations; in a court of twenty-three judges there are 1,771 possible
groups of three. The diminished efficacy of the en banc proceeding, along with the greatly increased number of decisional units,
places an enormous stress on the Supreme Court as the only
means to iron out unevenness within each circuit as well as between circuits. Yet the Supreme Court, consisting of nine justices, is obviously limited in its capacity. In fact, the Supreme
Court is simply incapable institutionally of monitoring the current volume of circuit court decisions. The statistics tell the tale:
a generation or two ago the Supreme Court was reviewing upward of a third of all circuit court decisions; today the Court
reviews less than one percent.136
In the years prior to 1891 the systemic problem was how to
devise a coherent appellate supervision of trial court decisions
where the number of trial courts and the volume of their decisions had swollen enormously. The Supreme Court, as the single
federal appellate tribunal, had been overrun; it lacked the institutional capacity to deal with the number of appeals from the
trial level.
Today the problem is similar; yet there is a significant difference. Intermediate appellate courts cieated to meet the 1891
lack of capacity now lack a similar capacity themselves. The
courts at that level are unable institutionally to deal with the
134. E.g., Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980) (22 judges: 13 on the
majority opinion, 5 on a concurring opinion, 3 for a second concurrence, 1 in dissent);
United States v. Dohm, 618 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1980) (23 judges: 10 on the plurality
opinion, 4 on a concurring opinion, 1 concurring in the result only, 7 concurring in part
and dissenting in part, 1 separately concurring in part and dissenting in part); United
States' v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (23 judges: 12 on the majority, 6 in a
concurring opinion, 4 concurring in the result only, 1 separately concurring); Harryman
v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980) (23 judges: 8 on the plurality opinion, 3 on a
concurring opinion, 2 on a second concurrence, 9 on a third concurrence, 1concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
135. Hufstedler, Courtship and Other Legal Arts, 60 A.B.A.J. 545, 546-47 (1974);
see Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and What the Court
L. REV.335, 341 (1975). Between 1974 and 1976 the Supreme
Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL
Court gave plenary consideration to between 175 and 179 cases each term. See Hellman,
The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary
Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARV.L. REV.1711, 1727 n.74 (1978). This compared with approximately 15,500 and 18,400 cases filed annually in the courts of appeals during the
ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICEU.S. COURTSANN. REP. 305, table
same period. [1977] DIRECTOR
B3.
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swollen volume of appeals in a way that preserves a reasonable
nationwide uniformity in federal law. The Supreme Court lacks
the capacity to maintain that uniformity through its supervision
of the intermediate appellate courts.
The response in 1891 was to alter the federal judicial structure by introducing an intermediate appellate level. The appropriate response today is much more complicated. The solution
proposed by the Hruska Commission is to insert still another
tier into the judicial structure, a National Court of Appeals, between the regional courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.lu
Thus far, however, the idea of an additional appellate layer has
not elicited sufficient support to pass Congress. There is reluctance to lengthen the ladder between the bottom and the top of
the system. Nevertheless, it is possible that this may be the best
solution, considering all of its advantages and disadvantages.
Another approach to the problem, which has not been extensively explored, is to employ a subject matter organization
within the intermediate appellate tier. This type of organization
could accommodate numerous judges within a single appellate
court to deal with a large volume of cases. Subject matter organization has been used for decades, apparently with sound results,
in the appellate court system of Germany. Today in the Federal
Republic of Germany there are appellate courts consisting of
well over one hundred judges each?? Within each of these
courts, docket and panel assignments are arranged along subject
matter lines. Each of these courts is divided into groups of either
five or seven judges, and each small group is assigned a designated but varied mixture of cases. Typically, each group has several categories of cases. Even so, each group's caseload represents a relatively small percentage of the court's docket. Under
this system, even if the court itself has over 100 judges, there
will be an identifiable appellate body of five, or no more than
seven, judges who deal with a given type of case. The values of
predictability and certainty associated with a small, fixed appellate forum are preserved as to each category of case, regardless
of the total number of judges on the court. This system makes
136. See notes 61, 63, 65 and accompanying text supra.
137. The numbers of judges on the German appellate courts can be derived from
Handbuch der Justiz (1978 ed.). A description of the German appellate system is contained in HEYDE,
THEADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE
IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY
(1971). See also Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization-The German Design
from an American Perspective, 5 H a s n ~ c sINT'L& COMP.L. REV.- (1982).
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the addition of judges and the expansion in the number of decisional entities at the appellate level far less difficult.
Subject matter organization could be installed in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. In the larger circuits-those exceeding nine
judges-the docket could be allocated among panels on a subject
matter basis. Panels could remain intact for substantial periods
of time, perhaps three years, with a staggered, gradual rotation.
In any one circuit, at any one time, there would be a fixed panel
of judges dealing with each particular type of case, but no judge
would be confined to a single type of case. The system would
preserve the values of stability and continuity, while avoiding
the pitfalls of a permanent specialization for any individual
judge. For example, in the course of a judicial career of ten or
fifteen years, a judge would rotate through several panels and
deal with a variety of types of cases.138Presumably such an internal arrangement could be established by the individual court
of appeals or by the Judicial Conference of the United States for
all circuits. Alternatively, the plan could be embodied in
legislation.
Using a subject-matter assignment system within each circuit would reduce the number of decisional units nationwide for
most types of cases to the number of circuits, twelve. That is a
vast improvement over the many dozens of such units that presently exist. However, even with twelve decisional units there will
still be occasional inter-circuit conflicts and long delays in settling a disputed issue of federal law. For certain kinds of cases
there is a compelling need for early resolution and a high degree
of national uniformity. For those cases, a single appellate forum
can be designated to entertain all appeals nationwide. For example, since the Second World War, Congress has created a Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals on two occasions, to deal
with. wage and price control and energy matters, on the theory
that there was a compelling need for nationwide uniformity.18@
138. The idea of subject matter organization was put forward in Carrington, supra
note 53, and was discussed in P. CARRINGTON,
D. MEADOR
& M. ROSENBERG,
JUSTICEON
APPEAL185-224 (1976).
139. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 204(c), 56 Stat. 31, established the Emergency Court of Appeals. Its jurisdiction was expanded by the Housing
and Rent Act of 1948, ch. 161, 1 202, 62 Stat. 93 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. 58 1884,
1894, 1898 (1976)); and the Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932,64 Stat. 798 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. $5 2061-2166 (Supp. I1 1978)).Authority for that Emergency Court
terminated in 1962. The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals was later established
pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210,85
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The two types of cases where the need for uniformity today
is considered most prevalent are tax and patent cases. There
have been recurrent suggestions to create jurisdiction in a single
forum over tax appeals, and a bill was introduced in 1979 to establish such a forum.140 Another pending bill would create a U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which would have nationwide appellate jurisdiction over patent cases. No doubt there
are other categories that could be identified as special needs
arise, and there are, of course, various ways in which a forum
can be established to entertain such nationwide appeals.
Two of these ways are illustrated in the currently pending
bills. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit would be a
permanent appellate court manned by its own circuit judges.
The proposed tax appeals court would be a forum consisting of
judges drawn from the existing U.S. Courts of Appeals, sitting
by designation for terms of years and convening periodically to
hear tax appeals. Each of these courts would be on line with the
existing courts of appeals.
All of the above are simply suggested approaches to resolve
the current difficulties at the intermediate appellate level. As explained by Professor Paul Carrington twelve years ago, the current situation poses a substantial threat to the national law.141
The threat has not diminished and, indeed, is rising with the
increase in the number of appellate decisional units and the inefficacy of the en banc procedure.
Three other problem areas in the federal judiciary require
immediate attention. None of the three is clearly superior to the
others. Therefore, the order in which they are set forth beIow
does not necessarily indicate their relative importance.
Non-Article 111Judicial Officers and Adjuncts. As noted
earlier, reactions to swollen caseloads have caused a sizable
growth in the non-Article I11 personnel of the federal judiciary.
The relative status of these judicial officers has also been heightened. Bankruptcy "referees" have been converted, by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,142into bankruptcy "judges," with
Stat. 743 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 5 5305 note, 12 U.S.C. 5 1904 notes, 15 U.S.C. 3 1026
(1978)); and the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627
(codified at 15 U.S.C. $5 751, 754 (1976)).
140. S. 678, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see hearings cited at note 111 supra.
141. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to
the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV.
L. REV.542 (1969).
142. See note 124 supra.
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additional personnel and support. The "bankruptcy court" is
now virtually a separate court system within the federal judiciary. Federal magistrates have been given broadened authority to
try civil and criminal cases. These magistrates are, in function,
becoming a subordinate tier of courts under the district courts.
Central staff attorneys in the courts of appeals have grown in
number; for example, there are now approximately thirty in the
Ninth Circ~it."~
They perform important tasks in screening appeals, preparing memoranda on the cases, and recommending
dispositions. These developments have raised apprehensions
that the independence of the judiciary, the status of Article I11
judges, and the quality of adjudication may be eroded by the
extensive use of persons who are not Article I11 judges.lu
At the same time, there is rising interest among students of
judicial organizations in the use of judicial "adjuncts." These are
professionals of various kinds within the judiciary who perform
tasks similar to those performed in part in the past by special
masters and receivers. In the public-law litigation that has blossomed in the federal judiciary over the past two decades, adjuncts have even wider roles in assisting judges to develop appropriate forms of relief and to oversee the implementation of
judicial decrees.14' The introduction of judicial adjuncts can be
helpful and, indeed, may be essential to enable the judiciary to
perform adequately. But extensive use of such persons raises
concern about the role of Article I11 judges.
Non-Article I11 judges and adjuncts have come into the federal system and have grown in status and responsibility without
any overall planning about their appropriate use and the limits
on their use. The time has come for a comprehensive canvass of
the use of such persons. This could include the drafting of proposed legislation that would revise the use of these persons, integ a t e them more uniformly into the federal judicial structure, or
convert some of them into Article I11 judges.
The inquiry would also include consideration of the proposal of the Levi-appointed Justice Department committee to cre143. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CALIF.L. REV.937 (1980); Oakley & Thompson, Law Clerks in Judges' Eyes:
Tradition and Innovation in the Use of Legal Staff by American Judges, 67 CALIF.L.
REV.1286, 1294 (1979).
144. E.g., Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary,
31 ALA. L. REV.261 (1980).
145. J. Weinberg, The Role of Judicial Adjuncts in Implementing Public Law Remedies (paper submitted to Council on the Role of Courts, Jan. 1980).
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ate a separate set of Article I administrative law courts.lq6These
courts, perhaps with trial and appellate divisions, would review
the great mass of disputes arising out of federal regulatory laws
on such matters as health, occupational safety, social security,
and the environment. The separate courts might absorb much of
the present work handled by administrative law judges, whose
role might also be included within this study."'
In short, what is needed is a system-wide inquiry into the
appropriate allocation of functions between Article I11 judges
and all other non-Article I11 officers and personnel that are or
might be involved in the adjudicative work of the nation under
federal law.
Availability of Federal Trial Courts for the Resolution of
Controversies Governed by State Law. Article I11 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to determine to what extent, if
any, the federal district courts may entertain controversies governed wholly by state law between parties from different states.
Congress has always authorized some measure of diversity jurisdiction, although it was narrowly limited until 1875. The question of the appropriate extent of such federal trial court jurisdiction has been a matter of discussion and debate throughout
American history.lqSIn recent years serious efforts have been
made to eliminate entirely the presently existing general diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in the district courts.14@That effort has wide and substantial backing, but it also encounters opposition from some segments of the litigating bar. Thus far that
opposition has proven successful in blocking congressional action
to alter diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
Given the political influence of certain litigating lawyers and
the general congressional inertia on questions of court reform,
enactment of the proposal to eliminate the general diversity jurisdiction seems unlikely in the near future. Moreover, the de-

147. For pertinent discussion, see Abrams, Administrative Law Judge Systems: The
California View, 29 AD. L. REV.487 (1977); Mans, Selecting the "Hidden Judiciary":
How the Merit Process Works in Choosing Administrative Law Judges (pt. 2 ) , 63 JUDICATURE 130 (1979); Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco-A Reprise, 47 U . CHI.L. REV.57 (1979);
Segal, The Administrative Law Judge-Thirty Years of Progress and the Road Ahead,
62 A.B.A.J. 1424 (1976).
P. MISHKIN,
D. SHAPIRO
& H. WECHSLER,
HART& WECHSLER'S
THE
148. P. BATOR,
FEDERAL
COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM
1051-53 (2d ed. 1973).
149. See note 28 supra.
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bates of recent years have identified certain situations in which
a federal district court can serve a useful contemporary function
by providing a forum where no state court could adjudicate the
entire controversy. The existing interpleader jurisdiction is an
excellent e~arnp1e.l~~
Other situations that have been identified
include the so-called "mass tort" cases. Perhaps the best illustration of this is a commercial airline disaster, which may give
rise to dozens or even hundreds of claims on behalf of persons
residing in many states. In those situations suits typically are
filed in many states, and there is no way to gather them all into
a single state forum.
In other situations no single state forum may be available
because the cases involve multiple defendants located in several
states. Supreme Court decisions have placed limits on the reach
of state in personam jurisdiction.161 In these situations a federal
district court given extended in personam jurisdiction by statute
can provide the useful function of settling the entire case in a
single lawsuit. The ALI study sought to deal with this problem.'" If separate actions were filed in different federal districts
or state courts, a combination of appropriate removal provisions,
the transfer authority,16sand action by the multidistrict panellM
could gather the suits into a single federal district.
The contemporary role of diversity jurisdiction needs a
comprehensive recanvassing. The American Law Institute study
in 1968 made an excellent start.lS6I t attempted to identify situations where a single state court, because of dispersed parties,
cannot adjudicate an entire controversy. However, the study left
intact much of the present diversity jurisdiction. Future efforts
should seek to eliminate diversity jurisdiction unless there is a
compelling, demonstrable, and useful purpose to be served by
making available a federal trial court for purely state law cases.
Under diversity jurisdiction, the substantive rights and interests involved are beyond the reach of congressional power;
typically these cases are governed purely by state law. Yet there
is no way for the state courts to review and correct erroneous
150. 28 U.S.C.8 1335 (1976).
151. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
152. AMERICAN
LAWINSTITUTE,
STUDYOF THE DIVISION
OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN
STATEAND FEDERAL
COURTS
$8 2371-2376 (1963).
153. 28 U.S.C. 5 1404(a) (1976).
154. 28 U.S.C. 5 1407 (1976).
155. See note 48 supra.
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decisions in the federal courts. Additionally, Congress has no authority to deal with the substance of those decisions. Congressional authority comes into play only for the limited purpose of
making available a federal trial forum. Thus, federal diversity
jurisdiction can be restricted or eliminated without Congress'
dealing with sensitive underlying substantive rights and interests. The potential relief to the federal courts is substantial; involved are well over 34,000 district court cases annually, almost
one-quarter of the entire civil docket of the district courts.lS6
System-Wide Administration of the Federal Judiciary. At
the national level the administration of the federal judiciary is
fragmented; it lacks any single official charged with the responsibility of administering the system.16' The highest administrative
authority is the Judicial Conference of the United States, a collegial body consisting of twenty-four judges, which deals with
administrative policies.lW Subordinate to it is the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the judiciary's housekeeper, paymaster, and statistician.lm The Federal Judicial
Center, which operates under its own board of directors, is the
research and education arm of the judiciary.160 The Chief Justice
of the United States chairs the Judicial Conference. In addition,
he has come to perform a wide variety of administrative tasks,
simply because there is no other official charged with these particular responsibilities. These tasks, which cannot be performed
by a collegial body or by administrative personnel who are not
judges, must be performed by someone.
One result is a serious overloading of the office of Chief Justice. In addition to having the same judicial duties as the other
eight justices, the Chief Justice is charged with presiding over
the Supreme Court and all of its business. The responsibility is
more than enough for one official. There is little time to perform
system-wide administrative chores in addition to presiding over
the Supreme Court. One of these jobs is likely to be slighted. As
156. 1979 ANN.REP.,note 5 supra.
157. This problem and possible solutions to it are more fully discussed in Meador,
The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 VA.L. REV.1031 (1979).
158. The Judicial Conference evolved from the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges,
which had been established in 1922 primarily to aid the Chief Justice in the effective use
of his intercircuit assignment power. 28 U.S.C. 8 331 (1976). See P. FISH,THEPOLITICS
OF FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
34 (1973).
159. See The Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223
(codified at 28 U.S.C. $ 620 (1976)).
160. 28 U.S.C. $5 611, 620-29 (1976).
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the federal judiciary grows, this problem will worsen.
There is need to create a single officer within the judiciary
with sufficient status and authority to enable him to administer
the system effectively on a day-to-day basis. There is more than
one way to achieve this.lB1A judicial officer could be appointed
as an assistant to the Chief Justice to perform the administrative tasks. Alternatively, an administrative head could be designated to perform this function, responsible directly to the Judicial Conference. An appropriate title for such a position might
bc "Chancellor of the United States Courts." However such a
new administrator is positioned and structured, he should have
unambiguous authority to oversee the operations of the Administrative Office and to perform system-wide administrative tasks
presently being performed, out of institutional default, by the
Chief Justice. Careful study is needed to determine how the new
office can best be inserted near the top of the federal judiciary.
Identification of the foregoing four problem areas is not intended to suggest that there are not numerous other matters
needing prompt and serious attention. For example, the proposal to eliminate the Supreme Court's obligatory appellate jurisdiction, now pending before Congress, should be enacted without delay. This idea has been studied for many years and is
universally endorsed.lB2It requires no further study, only congressional action.
Other proposals currently pending before Congress should
also be enacted. These include creation of advisory committees
on rules of procedure and internal operations for the courts of
appeals, alteration of the terms of chief judges, and creation of a
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and a U.S. Claims
Court.le3
In summary, the top four priorities for congressional action
concerning the federal judiciary are:
1. Intermediate appellate court restructuring;
2. Non-Article I11 judicial officers and adjuncts;
3. Availability of federal trial courts for the resolution of controversies governed by state law;
161. The two suggestions contained in this paragraph are more fully developed in
Meador, The Federal Judiciary and Its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. REV.1031
(1979).
162. See note 92 supra. See also Gressman, Requiem for the Supreme Court's Obligatory Jurisdiction, 65 A.B.A.J. 1325 (1979).
163. These proposals were all contained in S. 677 and S. 678, cited at note 94 supra.
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Any course of action adopted to deal with the federal judiciary should have two objectives: first, the development of a set of
proposals aimed at the priority problems of the federal courts,
proposals that are also likely to enlist substantial support; second, the enactment of the proposals by the Congress. The
achievement of those two objectives calls for, among other
things, effective leadership, continuity of effort, the involvement
of all three branches of the federal government, and the active
participation of lawyers and key bar groups.
The time is ripe for a fresh initiative. All of the work of the
last dozen years has been useful, and perhaps even necessary, to
pave the way toward some larger, more fundamental steps. Congressional increases in judicial personnel and the actions of the
courts themselves in reshaping ways of managing and conducting business have put the entire federal judiciary in a new
posture. Although these steps have worked improvements and
have enabled the judiciary to deal better with its volume of business, basic problems remain and new problems have arisen.
These problems can be tackled anew, in light of the perceptions
gained from all the studies that have gone before and from the
changes that have been wrought in the judiciary since the mid1970's. With the present system now larger and different, we
know more now than we knew then.
The ingredients necessary for a successful effort might best
be supplied in the form of a commission. A carefully constructed
commission could, in a unique way, bring to bear on these
problems the wisdom, ideas, and interests of the three branches
of the federal government, the bar, the public, the researchers,
and the scholars. Such a body should have a clearly identified
mission and timetable. It should have sufficient resources and an
adequate lifespan to enable it to develop the necessary proposals, to enlist support behind them, and to see them through to
congressional enactment.
The timetable must be realistic. Experiences in the years
before 1891 and since 1968 indicate that quick results are unlikely. Although the timetable should be such as to bring about
results within a reasonable time, it must allow for the building
of a consensus around the key proposals. The year 1989 provides
a useful and symbolic target. It would allow eight years from the
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present, a period which compares favorably with the eleven
years consumed after 1880 in bringing about the Evarts Act. The
job could be completed before the present decade is over, and
1989 marks the 200th anniversary of the creation of the federal
judiciary. The body charged with developing and promoting the
significant judicial reforms might be called "The 1989 Commission on the Federal Judiciary."
Given the target date of 1989, this plan of action should fall
into three phases. The first involves the establishment and organization of the commission. With perseverance and luck this
could be accomplished by the fall of 1982. Once organized, the
commission's initial task would be to develop proposals to deal
with the priority problems outlined above. This would involve a
survey of all available ideas in the literature and existing studies
and reports. In addition, submission of new ideas and fresh data
should be widely encouraged. Two years should be allotted to
this phase. Thus by the end of 1984, proposals should be ready
for introduction in Congress.
The last phase of the plan involves the efforts necessary to
bring about congressional enactment of the proposals. Under the
suggested timetable, bills embodying the proposals would be introduced at the beginning of the 99th Congress, convening in
January 1985. That timing is particularly advantageous since the
introduction of the proposals would coincide with the beginning
of a new presidential term, thus allowing four years and two
Congresses for their consideration, free of the distorting interferences of a presidential election. Experience suggests that two
Congresses are usually necessary for the enactment of most new
measures; dispersion of congressional attention, the building of
the necessary political support, and the hearing processes in two
Houses make it difficult to bring a bill from introduction to enactment within the two-year span of a single Congress. If this
timetable is adhered to, the proposals would be enacted by the
close of the 100th Congress and become effective not later than
1989, the 200th anniversary of the federal judiciary and of the
ratification of the Constitution.
An important part of the commission's work would involve
the building of support for its proposals. Proposals without a realistic chance of political acceptance are pointless. The building
of support would start during the two-year period when the proposals are under development. The process of development
would involve bringing in persons and groups across the country,
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enlisting their interest and ideas, and hence, ultimate support
for the resulting product. Once the proposals were introduced
into Congress, the commission would concentrate on stimulating
the kinds of political support that typically are lacking in judicial reform efforts. This would involve liaison with state and local bar groups, collaboration with congressional committees in
developing hearings, and a general educational effort through
the news media to stimulate public support for the measures.
The commission would, of course, require adequate financial
support. An able, full-time director would be necessary, assisted
by perhaps two professionals and two secretarialhlerical persons. Funds also would be necessary for office expenses and the
expenses of commission members in attending meetings. A total
of approximately two million dollars should be sufficient for the
commission to carry out the entire plan.
How should "The 1989 Commission" be established? There
are three possibilities: congressional action, presidential action,
and private, nongovernmental action.
Congress could establish such a commission, just as it established the Hruska Commission. In several respects this would
perhaps be the best process. A statutory enactment could bring
to the commission key persons from all branches and ensure,
more effectively than other means, their serious attention to the
subject. Adequate funding could be provided. Since the enterprise would have been given an initial congressional blessing, the
proposals subsequently recommended by the commission might
be treated more seriously by Congress.
A disadvantage of attempting to secure congressional creation of the commission is that this effort in itself could become a
major undertaking consuming several years. Moreover, as is illustrated by the nonaction in the six years since the submission
of the Hruska Commission report, there is no guarantee that a
congressionally created commission will move Congress to act. If,
however, key members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees are interested in the idea and are disposed to move
promptly, this route should be pursued.
A more expeditious means of bringing the commission into
being might be a presidential executive order. The moment is
opportune for the launching of such a presidential initiative. A
new President took office in January 1981.As with any new administration, there likely will be interest in new programs and
fresh starts on numerous fronts, with an opportunity to include
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judicial reform on the agenda. There will be no better time for
at least another four years to obtain presidential backing for
such a significant step on behalf of the courts.
Assuming that the President would agree to the creation of
such a commission, the next crucial step would be to obtain the
cooperation and support of key people from the other two
branches of government. Contacts should be made on behalf of
the President with the chairmen and ranking minority members
of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees and perhaps
with other members of those committees. Similar contacts
should be made with the Chief Justice. These contacts should be
made to obtain the cooperation and support of these officials in
the judicial and legislative branches. Every effort should be
made by the administration to deal with the problem in a bipartisan way, sharing responsibility and involvement with the other
two branches of the government and with key members of the
major political parties. The interbranch seminars on the federal
judiciary, held for the last four years, should facilitate such communication on court problems.lM
One way to obtain bipartisan involvement of the other governmental branches would be to ask the chairmen and ranking
minority members of the two Judiciary Committees to designate
persons to sit on the commission and likewise to ask the Judicial
Conference and the Chief Justice to designate members. The
President would, of course, designate members also. The resulting commission would thereby reflect the interests and concerns
of all three branches of the government.
In the absence of action by Congress or the President, the
enterprise might still be launched through the initiative of individuals and nongovernmental institutions. The first step would
be to secure adequate funding over a period of years. The
sources for such funding would be private foundations. But who
would seek such funding? The task could be undertaken by
some existing organization such as an educational institution or
an independent research entity. Alternatively, a few well-organized individuals might take the initiative to secure the necessary
funding, although the supporting foundations might require that
the funds be vested in an existing entity in which the founda164. For a description of these seminars, under the aegis of the Brookings Institution, see Cannon & Cikins, Interbranch Cooperation in Improving the Administration of
Justice: A Major Innovation, 38 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1 (1981).
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tions have confidence. While this initial step would not be easy,
given sufficient interest and determination by at least some influential individuals or organizations, it is not insuperable.
Whatever the means of bringing the commission into being,
its composition should reflect the perspectives, ideas, and interests of the three branches of the federal government, various
segments of the bar, and students of the judiciary. To achieve
this, the commission should consist of members of the Congress,
the judiciary, and the executive branch. If such officials themselves are not available to serve, or prefer not to serve, persons
designated by them should be included on the commission. Indeed, in some instances, designees of the officials would be preferable to the officials themselves in that such persons could
devote more time to the commission's work and could function
free of awkward or possibly conflicting political considerations.
A body of approximately twenty members should be large
enough to accommodate all of the desired perspectives and interests yet small enough to work collegially and effectively.
The following is a list of the officials and institutions, governmental bodies, nongovernmental groups, and other groups
that should be represented on the commission, with a suggested
number of persons in each category:
-the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Senate
and House Judiciary Committees (four persons);
-the Attorney General of the United States (one person);
-the Chief Justice of the United States (one person);
-the Judicial Conference of the United States (two persons);
-the Director of the Federal Judicial Center (one person);
-the Director of the National Center for State Courts (one
person);
-the Conference of Chief Justices (two persons);
-each of the major national organizations concerned with law
and the courts, including the American Bar Association, the
American Judicature Society, the National Bar Association,
the National Association of Women Lawyers, and perhaps
others (one person each);
-the academic world, including law professors knowledgeable
about the federal judiciary (two or three persons).

In addition, the group should include one person experienced in
management and organization of large, complex enterprises.
The twelve years of study and effort that have gone by will
not be wasted if we build upon that work and move on with a
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coherent plan of action. Determined, positive, and prompt steps
must be taken, however. With no powerful constituency, with no
identified leader in the political arena committed to the cause,
and with no public demand, action is unlikely unless individuals
in public and private life who are concerned with the problems
of the federal judiciary band together as a catalytic force. The
number need not be large, but it must include persons of influence respected in law and government. The primary mission of
this group would be to bring into being the kind of commission
described above, which in turn would be charged with getting
the job done not later than 1989. Putting the federal judiciary in
a position to perform its mission effectively under Article 111 of
the Constitution would be the best possible celebration of its
200th anniversary.

